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Abstract 
This Article analyzes four early modern Protestant models of marriage that 
emerged in place of the medieval Catholic sacramental model. These are the 
Lutheran social model of marriage in Germany and Scandinavia, the Calvinist 
covenantal model in Geneva, France, the Netherlands, and Scotland, the Anglican 
commonwealth model in England and its colonies, and the budding separationist 
model of marriage developed by John Locke. Theologically, the differences between 
these models can be traced to medieval Catholic sacramental theology, Lutheran 
two kingdoms doctrines, Calvinist covenantal constructions, Anglican commonwealth 
theory, and Lockean contractarian theories, respectively. Politically, these 
differences can be seen in shifts in marital jurisdiction: Medieval Catholics vested 
exclusive marital jurisdiction in the church. Anglicans left marital jurisdiction to 
church courts, subject to royal oversight and Parliamentary legislation. Calvinists 
assigned interlocking marital roles to local consistories and city councils. Lutherans 
consigned primary marital jurisdiction to the territorial prince or urban council. Locke 
pressed for a sharper separation of church and state in the governance of marriage. 
The Article concludes with a brief reflection of the implications of these early modern 
teachings, especially Locke’s, for modern contests over church, state, and family. 
Keywords: Martin Luther; John Calvin; Henry VIII; John Locke; Roman 
Catholicism; Lutheranism; Calvinism; Anglicanism; Enlightenment; marriage; family 
law; religious liberty; church-state relations; marital pluralism 
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Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 177–256; Sex, Marriage and Family in 
John Calvin’s Geneva, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005, 2012 ) 
(with Robert M. Kingdon); To Have and to Hold: Marrying and its Documentation in Western 
Christendom, 400-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) (with Philip L. Reynolds); 
and The Reformation of Rights: Law, Religion, and Human Rights in Early Modern Calvinism 




Marriage was one of the hotly contested issues of the sixteenth-century 
Protestant Reformation and one of the first institutions to be reformed. The leading 
Protestant theologians — Martin Luther and Philip Melanchthon, Thomas Cranmer 
and William Tyndale, Martin Bucer and John Calvin — all prepared lengthy tracts on 
the subject in their first years of reform. Scores of leading jurists took up legal 
questions of marriage in their consilia and commentaries, often working under the 
direct inspiration of Protestant theology and theologians. Virtually every city and 
territory on the Continent that converted to the Protestant cause in the first half of the 
sixteenth century had new marriage laws on the books within a decade after 
accepting the Reformation. 
The Protestant reformers’ early preoccupation with marriage was partly driven 
by their theology. Many of the core issues of the Reformation were implicated by the 
prevailing Catholic sacramental theology and canon law of marriage. The medieval 
Catholic Church’s jurisdiction over marriage was, for the reformers, a particularly 
flagrant example of the church’s usurpation of the state’s authority. The Catholic 
sacramental concept of marriage, on which the church predicated its jurisdiction, 
was for the reformers a self-serving theological fiction. The canonical prohibition on 
the marriage of clergy and monastics stood sharply juxtaposed to Protestant 
doctrines of sexual sin and the Christian vocation. The canon law’s long roll of 
impediments to betrothal and marriage, its prohibitions against complete divorce and 
remarriage, and its close regulations of sexuality, parenting, and education all stood 
in considerable tension with the reformers’ understanding of the Bible. That a child 
could enter marriage without parental permission or church consecration betrayed, 
in the reformers’ views, basic responsibilities of family, church, and state to children. 
Issues of marriage doctrine and law thus implicated and epitomized many of the 
cardinal theological issues of the Protestant Reformation. 
The reformers’ early preoccupation with marriage was also partly driven by 
their politics. A number of early leaders of the Reformation faced aggressive 
prosecution by the Catholic Church and its political allies for violation of the canon 
law of marriage and celibacy. Among the earliest Protestant leaders were ex-priests 
and ex-monastics who had forsaken their orders and vows, and married shortly 
thereafter. Indeed, one of the acts of solidarity with the new Protestant cause was to 
marry or divorce in open violation of the canon law and in defiance of a bishop’s 
instructions.  The most (in)famous example was the marriage of ex-monk Martin 
Luther with the ex-nun Katherine von Bora – an iconic act of marital freedom for 
Protestants, a flagrant crime of double spiritual incest for Catholics.  As Catholic 
Church authorities began to prosecute these canon law offences, Protestant 
theologians and jurists rose to the defense of their co-religionists, producing a welter 
of briefs, letters, sermons, and pamphlets that denounced traditional norms and 
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pronounced a new theology of marriage that was quickly translated into new legal 
terms.  
This Article analyzes the three main theological and legal models of church, 
state, and marriage produced, in response to prevailing Catholic norms, during the 
Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anglican Reformations.  It then shows how, a century later, 
the English philosopher, John Locke, sought to harmonize these oft-competing 
perspectives through a new commonwealth model of marriage.  
 
Medieval Catholic Background 
  
From the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries, marriage was principally subject to 
the theology and law of the Catholic Church.2  The medieval church treated marriage 
and the family in a threefold manner -- at once as a natural, contractual, and 
sacramental unit.  First, marriage was a natural association, created by God to 
enable man and woman to "be fruitful and multiply" (Gen. 1:28) and to raise children 
in the service and love of God.  Since the fall into sin, marriage had also become a 
remedy for lust, a channel to direct one's natural passion to the service of the 
community and the church.  Second, marriage was a contractual unit, formed in its 
essence by the mutual consent of the parties.  This contract prescribed for couples a 
life-long relation of love, service, and devotion to each other and proscribed 
unwarranted breach or relaxation of their connubial and parental duties.  Third, 
marriage, when properly contracted between Christians, rose to the dignity of a 
sacrament.  The temporal union of body, soul, and mind within the marital estate 
symbolized the eternal union between Christ and his church, and brought sanctifying 
grace to the couple, their children, and the church.  This sacramental perspective 
helped to integrate the natural and the contractual dimensions of marriage and to 
render marriage a central concern of the church and its canon law.  
Though a sacrament and a sound way of Christian living, however, marriage 
was not considered to be particularly spiritually edifying.  The medieval church 
regarded marriage more as a remedy for sin than a recipe for righteousness.  Marital 
life was considered less commendable than celibate life, propagation less virtuous 
than contemplation. Clerics and monastics were thus to forgo marriage as a 
condition for ecclesiastical service.  Those who could not forgo marriage were not 
worthy of the church's holy orders and offices.  Celibacy was something of a litmus 
test of spiritual discipline and social superiority. 
 
2 For good overviews, see James A. Brundage, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Charles Donahue, Law, Marriage and Society in the 
Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); R.H. Helmholz, Marriage 
Litigation in Medieval England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Theodore Mackin, 
S.J., Marriage in the Catholic Church, 2 vols. (New York: Paulist Press, 1984-1989); Philip L. 
Reynolds, Marriage in the Western Church: The Christianization of Marriage During the Patristic and 
Early Modern Periods (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994). 
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From the twelfth century forward, the Catholic Church built upon this 
conceptual foundation a comprehensive canon law of marriage that was enforced by 
church courts throughout much of Western Christendom.  From the twelfth to the 
sixteenth centuries, the church’s canon law of marriage was the principal marriage 
law of the West.  A civil law or a common law of marriage, where it existed, was 
generally considered supplemental and subordinate.  Consistent with the naturalist 
perspective on marriage, the canon law punished contraception and abortion as 
violations of the created marital functions of propagation and childrearing.  It 
proscribed unnatural relations, such as incest and polygamy, and unnatural acts 
such as bestiality, buggery, and sodomy.  Consistent with the contractual 
perspective, the canon law ensured voluntary unions by dissolving marriages formed 
through mistake, duress, fraud, or coercion, and granting husband and wife alike 
equal rights to enforce conjugal debts that had been voluntarily assumed.  
Consistent with the sacramental perspective, the church protected the sanctity and 
sanctifying purpose of marriage by declaring valid marital bonds to be indissoluble, 
and by dissolving invalid unions between Christians and non-Christians or between 
parties related by various legal, spiritual, blood, or familial ties.  This canon law of 
marriage, grounded in a rich sacramental theology and ecclesiastical jurisprudence, 
was formalized and systematized by the Council of Trent in the Decree Tametsi of 
1563. 
Three Sixteenth-Century Reformation Models    
The Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anglican branches of the Reformation 
dramatically reformed this Catholic inheritance.  Like Catholics, these various 
Protestant groups retained the naturalist perspective of marriage as an association 
created for procreation of children and protection of the couple from sexual sin.  
They also retained the contractual perspective of marriage as a voluntary 
association formed by the mutual consent of the couple.  Unlike Catholics, however, 
Protestants rejected the subordination of marriage to celibacy and the celebration of 
marriage as a sacrament.  According to common Protestant lore, the person was too 
tempted by sinful passion to forgo God's soothing remedy of marriage.  The celibate 
life had no superior virtue and was no prerequisite for ecclesiastical service.  It led 
too easily to concubinage and homosexuality and impeded too often the access and 
activities of the clerical office.  Moreover, marriage was not a sacrament.  It was 
instead an independent social institution ordained by God and equal in dignity and 
social responsibility with the church, state, and other social estates.  Participation in 
marriage required no prerequisite faith or purity and conferred no sanctifying grace, 
as did the true sacraments of baptism and the eucharist.   
From this common critique, the Lutheran, Calvinist, and Anglican traditions 
constructed their own models of marriage.  Each Protestant tradition provided a 
different theological formula for integrating the inherited contractual, natural, and 
spiritual perspectives on marriage.  Lutherans emphasized the social dimensions of 
marriage, Calvinists the covenantal dimensions, Anglicans the commonwealth 
dimensions.  Each Protestant tradition also assigned principal legal responsibility for 
marriage quite differently.  Lutherans consigned legal authority mostly to the state, 
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Calvinists to both state and church together, Anglicans mostly to the church subject 
to state oversight.  These differences in emphasis and authority among early 
Protestants were based, in part, on differences among their theological models of 
marriage.  
Lutheranism.  The Lutheran tradition, from 1517 forward, developed a social 
model of marriage, grounded in Martin Luther’s doctrine of the heavenly and earthly 
kingdoms.3  Marriage, Luther and his colleagues taught, was a social estate of the 
earthly kingdom of creation, not a sacred estate of the heavenly kingdom of 
redemption.  Though divinely ordained, marriage was directed primarily to human 
ends, to the fulfilling of civil and spiritual uses in the lives of the individual and of 
society.  Marriage revealed to persons their sin and their need for God's marital gift: 
this was its theological use.  Marriage restricted prostitution, promiscuity and other 
public sexual sins: this was its civil use. Marriage taught love, restraint, and other 
public virtues: this was its pedagogical use.   
Any fit man and woman were free to enter such unions, clerical and lay alike.  
Indeed, all persons were encouraged to marry when they came of age, unless they 
had the rare gift of continence.  To reject God’s gift of marriage was to court the sins 
of lust and to spurn the blessings of love.  Marriage was an especially important 
calling for the Christian pastor: a pastor’s own marital experience could only 
enhance his pastoral ministry to the married, and his marital parsonage would serve 
a model for proper Christian living in the community.  Marriage was also an 
important calling for the widow and the widower: this newly single party, who had 
known the warmth and pleasures of sexual intimacy, would be doubly tempted to 
sexual sin in its sudden absence.  
As part of the earthly kingdom, Lutheran reformers argued, marriage was 
subject to the civil law of the state, not to the canon law of the church. To be sure, 
marriage was still subject to God's law, but this law was now to be administered by 
Christian magistrates who were God's vice-regents in the earthly kingdom.  Church 
officials were required to counsel the magistrate about God's law and to cooperate 
with him in publicizing and disciplining marriage.  All church members, as part of the 
priesthood of believers, were required to counsel those who contemplated marriage, 
to admonish those who sought annulment or divorce, and to aid in the rearing of all 
children as their collective baptismal vows prescribed.  But principal legal authority 
over marriage and family life lay with the state, not with the church.  
 
3 For general overviews, see Steven Ozment, Ancestors: The Loving Family in Old Europe 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Joel F. Harrington, Reordering Marriage and 
Society in Reformation Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Uwe Sibeth, 
Eherecht und Staatsbildung: Ehegesetzgebung und Eherechtsprechung in der Landgrafschaft 
Hessen(-Kassel) in der frϋhen Neuzeit (Darmstadt: Hessischen Historischen Kommission Darmstadt, 
1994); Herman Selderhuis, Marriage and Divorce in the Thought of Martin Bucer, trans. John Vriend 
and Lyle D. Biersma (Kirksville, MO: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1999); Hartwig Dieterich, 
Das protestantische Eherecht in Deutschland bis zur Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts (Munich: Claudius 
Verlag, 1970). 
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This new Lutheran social model of marriage was reflected in the 
transformation of marriage law in Germany, Scandinavia, and other Lutheran polities 
of Western Europe.  Civil marriage courts replaced church courts.  New civil 
marriage statutes replaced traditional canon law rules.  Lutheran jurists published 
scores of treatises on marriage law, affirming and embellishing the new Lutheran 
theology of marriage.  The new Lutheran marriage law, like the new Lutheran 
marriage theology, remained indebted to the Catholic canon law tradition.  
Traditional marriage laws, like prohibitions against unnatural sexual relations and 
against infringement of basic marital functions, remained in effect.  Impediments that 
protected free consent, that implemented biblical prohibitions against marriage of 
relatives, and that governed the couple's physical relations were largely retained.  
Such laws were as consistent with the Catholic sacramental model as with the 
Lutheran social model of marriage.   
But changes in marriage theology also yielded changes in marriage law.  
Because the Lutheran reformers rejected the subordination of marriage to celibacy, 
they rejected laws that forbade clerical and monastic marriage, that denied 
remarriage to those who had married a cleric or monastic, and that permitted vows 
of chastity to annul promises of marriage.  Because they rejected the sacramental 
nature of marriage, the reformers rejected impediments of crime and heresy and 
prohibitions against divorce in the modern sense.  Marriage was for them the 
community of the couple in the present, not their sacramental union in the life to 
come.  Where that community was broken, for one of a number of specific reasons, 
such as adultery, desertion, or habitual abuse of spouse or children, the couple 
could sue for divorce, leaving at least the innocent party with the right to remarry.  
Because persons by their lustful nature were in need of God's remedy of marriage, 
the reformers removed numerous impediments to marriage not countenanced by 
Scripture.  Because of their emphasis on the Godly responsibility of the prince, the 
pedagogical role of the church and the family, and the priestly calling of all believers, 
the reformers insisted that both marriage and divorce be public.  The validity of 
marriage promises depended upon parental consent, witnesses, church 
consecration and registration, and priestly instruction.  Couples who wished to 
divorce had to announce their intentions in the church and community and to petition 
a civil judge to dissolve the bond.   
Calvinism.  The Calvinist tradition, established in mid-sixteenth century 
Geneva, set out a covenantal model of marriage.4  This model confirmed many of 
the Lutheran theological and legal reforms, but cast them in a new ensemble.  
Marriage, John Calvin and his followers taught, was not a sacramental institution of 
the church, but a covenantal association of the entire community, modeled on the 
 
4 Robert M. Kingdon, Adultery and Divorce in Calvin's Geneva (Cambridge, Mass./London, 1995); 
Walter Köhler, Zϋrcher Ehegericht und Genfer Konsistorium, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Verlag von M. Heinsius 
Nachfolger, 1942); Cornelia Seeger, Nullité de mariage divorce et séparation de corps a Genève, au 
temps de Calvin: Fondements doctrinaux, loi et jurisprudence (Lausanne: Méta-Editions, 1989); John 
Witte, Jr. and Robert M. Kingdon, Sex, Marriage, and Family in John Calvin’s Geneva, 2 vols. (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2005-2012). 
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covenant relationship between Yahweh and ancient Israel.  A variety of parties 
participated in the formation of this covenant.  The marital parties themselves swore 
their betrothals and espousals before each other and God -- rendering all marriages 
tripartite agreements, with God as third party witness, participant, and judge.  The 
couple's parents, as God's lieutenants for children, gave their consent to the union.  
Two witnesses, as God's priests to their peers, served as witnesses to the marriage.  
The minister, holding God's spiritual power of the Word, blessed the couple and 
admonished them in their spiritual duties during the mandatory church wedding 
liturgy.  The magistrate, holding God's temporal power of the sword, registered the 
couple and protected them in their person and property after the compulsory state 
licensing and registration of the marriage.  Each of these parties – parents and 
peers, ministers and magistrates -- was considered essential to the legitimacy of the 
marriage, for they each represented a different dimension of God's involvement in 
the covenant.  To omit any such party was, in effect, to omit God from the marriage 
covenant.  
The covenant of marriage, as Calvin understood it, was grounded in the order 
of creation and governed by the law of God.  At creation, God ordained the structure 
of marriage to be a life-long union between a fit man and a fit woman of the age of 
consent and with the capacity to enter a marital contract with each other.  God 
assigned to this marriage the interlocking purposes of mutual love and support of 
husband and wife, mutual procreation and nurture of children, and mutual protection 
of both parties from sexual sin. Thereafter, God set forth in reason, conscience, and 
the Bible, a whole series of commandments and counsels for proper adherence to 
this ideal created structure and purpose of marriage.   
God's moral law for the covenant of marriage set out two tracks of marital 
norms, Calvin taught -- civil norms, which are common to all persons, and spiritual 
norms, which are distinctly Christian.  This moral law, in turn, gave rise to two tracks 
of marital morality -- a simple morality of duty demanded of all persons regardless of 
their faith, and a higher morality of aspiration demanded of believers in order to 
reflect their faith.  It was the church's responsibility to teach aspirational spiritual 
norms for marriage and family life.  It was the state's responsibility to enforce 
mandatory civil norms.  This division of responsibility was reflected in sixteenth-
century Geneva and later Calvinist polities in the procedural divisions between the 
church consistory and the city council.  In marriage cases, the consistory was the 
court of first instance, and would call parties to their higher spiritual duties, backing 
their recommendations with threats of spiritual discipline.  If such spiritual counsel 
and discipline failed, the parties were referred to the city council to compel them, 
using civil and criminal sanctions, to honor at least their basic civil duties for 
marriage. 
This Calvinist covenantal model mediated both sacramental and contractual 
understandings of marriage.  On the one hand, this covenant model confirmed the 
sacred and sanctifying qualities of marriage -- without ascribing to it sacramental 
functions.  Marriage was regarded as a holy and loving fellowship, a compelling 
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image of the bond between Yahweh and his elect, Christ and his church.  But 
marriage was no sacrament, for it confirmed no divine promise.  On the other hand, 
this covenant model confirmed the contractual and consensual qualities of marriage 
-- without subjecting it to the personal preferences of the parties.  Marriage 
depended for its validity and utility on the voluntary consent of the parties.  But 
marriage was more than a mere contract, for God was a third party to every 
marriage covenant, and he set its basic terms in the order and law of creation.  
Freedom of contract in marriage was thus effectively limited to choosing maturely 
which party to marry -- with no real choice about the form, forum, or function of 
marriage once a fit and willing spouse was chosen. 
This new Calvinist model of marriage was reflected in a long series of new 
statutes that Calvin and his colleagues helped to craft for Geneva in the 1540s to 
1560s, and these were emulated in numerous Calvinist communities throughout 
Europe and later North America. These statutes governed in copious detail marital 
formation, maintenance, and dissolution, child care, custody, and control, spousal 
rights, responsibilities, and remedies and more -- often combining Catholic canon 
law, Lutheran civil law, classical Roman law, and ancient Talmudic law, together with 
striking legal innovations introduced by Calvin and his colleagues.    
Anglicanism. The Anglican tradition of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries brought forth a commonwealth model of marriage.5  This model embraced 
the sacramental, social, and covenantal models inherited from the Continent but 
went beyond them.  Marriage was at once a gracious symbol of the divine, a social 
unit of the earthly kingdom, and a solemn covenant with one's spouse.  But the 
essential cause, condition, and calling of the family was that it served and 
symbolized the common good of the couple, the children, the church, and the state 
all at once.  Marriage was appointed by God as "a little commonwealth" to foster the 
mutual love, service, and security of husband and wife, parent and child.  It was 
likewise appointed by God as a "seedbed and seminary" of the broader 
commonwealth to teach church, state, and society alike essential Christian and 
political norms and habits.   
At first, this commonwealth model served to rationalize the traditional 
hierarchies of husband over wife, parent over child, church over household, state 
over church.  After decades of experimentation, England in the mid-sixteenth century 
had formally rejected most Protestant legal reforms of marriage introduced on the 
Continent.  It returned to much of the medieval canon law of marriage administered 
by the church, but now under the supreme headship of the English Crown and the 
legal direction of Parliament.  To call the marital household "a little commonwealth" 
 
5 Chilton L. Powell, English Domestic Relations 1487–1653: A Study of Matrimony and Family Life in 
Theory and Practice as Revealed by the Literature, Law, and History of the Period (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1917); Eric Josef Carlson, Marriage and the English Reformation (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1994); James T. Johnson, A Society Ordained by God: English Puritan Marriage Doctrine 
in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970); Lawrence Stone, The 
Family, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1500–1800 (New York: Harper & Row, 1979). 
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was to signal its subordinate place within the new hierarchy of social institutions that 
comprised "the great commonwealth" of England.  It was also to call the household 
to an internal hierarchy of offices that matched the royal and episcopal offices of the 
great commonwealth – with the paterfamilias’ role of ruler within each family serving 
as a miniature model of the king as the supreme head of the church and 
commonwealth of England.  The commonwealth model was thus used to integrate a 
whole network of parallel domestic and political duties rooted in the Bible and 
English tradition. Anglican divines and moralists expounded at great length the 
reciprocal duties of husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant that 
would produce a well-ordered little commonwealth.  And, in keeping with the tradition 
of stability of the great political commonwealth of England, these same Anglican 
writers prohibited the dissolution of this little domestic commonwealth of the family 
by divorce.  
As the political concept of the English commonwealth was revolutionized and 
democratized in the seventeenth century, however, so was the English 
commonwealth model of marriage.  The traditional hierarchies of husband over wife, 
parent over child, and church over family were challenged with a revolutionary new 
principle of equality.  The biblical duties of husband and wife and of parent and child 
were recast as the natural rights of each household member against the other.  The 
traditional idea of a created natural order met with a new idea of marriage, society, 
and state formed voluntarily by contracts by individuals in the state of nature.  Just 
as the English commonwealth could be rent asunder by force of arms when it 
abused the people's natural rights, so the family commonwealth could be put 
asunder by suits at law when one spouse abused the other’s marital rights.  Just as 
the King could be beheaded for abuses in the Commonwealth, so the paterfamilias 
could be removed from the head of the little commonwealth for abuses in the 
household.  This revolutionary construction of the commonwealth model provided 
the rationale for the incremental liberalization of English marriage law in the course 
of the next two centuries.  It also provided a stepping-stone for the development of a 
more overtly contractarian model of marriage slowly developed by Enlightenment 
reformers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
John Locke’s Commonwealth Model and the Road to Modernity  
 
 John Locke's reconstruction of the commonwealth model of marriage in his 
famous Two Treatises on Government (1690) provides a good example of a 
transition figure who sought to mediate these traditional Christian models of 
marriage with the emerging teachings of the Western Enlightenment.6  His insights 
also provide a good example of an early attempt to harmonize liberal and traditional 
views of marriage.  
 
6 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1698), ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1960). The quotes that follow are from ibid., I.9, 47, 98, II.2, 77-86.  On Locke’s 
family theory, see sources and discussion in Scott Yenor, Family Politics: The Idea of Marriage in 
Modern Political Thought (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2011), 19-38.  
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In his Two Treatises, Locke set out to refute Robert Filmer's monarchical 
theory of government, which was among the strongest traditional formulations of the 
Anglican commonwealth model available in the mid-seventeenth century.  Filmer 
had argued that God had created the patriarchal domestic commonwealth headed 
by the paterfamilias as the source of the hierarchical political commonwealth headed 
by the King.  God had created Adam and Eve as founders not only of the first 
marriage and family, but also of the first state and society.  Adam was the first 
husband but also the first ruler.  Eve was the first wife, but also the first subject.  
Together with their children, they comprised at once a domestic and a political 
commonwealth.  All persons thereafter were, by birth, subject to the highest male 
head, descended from Adam.7   
Locke responded to Filmer first by flatly denying any natural or necessary 
connection between the political and domestic commonwealths, between the 
authority of the paterfamilias and the power of the magistrate.  "[T]he Power of a 
Magistrate over a Subject," he wrote, "may be distinguished from that of a Father 
over his Children, a Master over his Servant, a Husband over his Wife, and a Lord 
over his Slave."  The "little Commonwealth" of the family is "very far from" the great 
commonwealth in England "in its Constitution, Power and End."  "[T]he Master of the 
Family has a very distinct and differently limited Power, both as to time and extent, 
over those several Persons that are in it; ... he has no Legislative Power of Life and 
Death over any of them, and none too but what a Mistress of a Family may have as 
well as he." 
Locke responded next by denying Filmer's patriarchal interpretation of the 
creation story in Genesis 1:26-28: “Then God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, 
after our likeness....  So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he 
created him, male and female he created them.  And God blessed them, and God 
said to them, ‘Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it...’.”  God did not 
create Adam and Eve as ruler and subject, but as husband and wife, said Locke.  
Adam and Eve were created equal before God.  Each had natural rights to use the 
bounties of Paradise.  Each had natural duties to each other and to God.  After the 
fall into sin, God expelled Adam and Eve from the Garden.  He increased man's 
labor in his use of creation.  He increased woman's labor in the bearing of children.  
He said to Eve: "thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee" 
(Gen. 3:16).  These words, said Locke, which Filmer "calls the Original Grant of 
Government were not spoken to Adam, neither indeed was there any Grant in them 
made to Adam; they were a Punishment laid upon Eve."  These words do not 
abrogate the natural equality, rights, and duties with which God created Adam and 
Eve, and all persons after them.  They do not render all wives eternally subject to 
their husbands.  And they certainly do not, as Filmer insists, give "a Father or a 
 
7 Robert Filmer, Patriarcha and other Political Works, ed. Peter Laslett (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1949); G.J. Schochet, Patriarchalism in Political Thought: The Authoritarian Family and 
Political Speculation and Attitudes Especially in Seventeenth Century England (New York: Basic 
Books, 1975). 
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Prince an Absolute, Arbitrary, Unlimited and Unlimitable Power, over the Lives, 
Liberties, and Estates, of his Children and Subjects."   
Men and women are born free and equal in the state of nature.  But "God 
having made Man such a Creature, that, in his own Judgment, it was not good for 
him to be alone, put him under strong Obligation of Necessity, Convenience, and 
Inclination to drive him into Society," Locke argued.  A person entered into society by 
entering into voluntary contracts with other persons of similar inclination.  To that 
extent, the commonwealths of marriage, church, and state might be said to be 
related, said Locke.  Each of these commonwealths was formed by the voluntary 
agreement of free and equal persons, moving from the state of nature to a social 
state.   
"The first Society" to be formed "was between Man and Wife, which gave 
beginning to that of Parents and Children."  This "conjugal society," like every other 
society, "is made by a voluntary Compact between Man and Woman: and tho' it 
consists chiefly in such a Communion and Right in one another’s Bodies, as is 
necessary to its Chief End, Procreation; yet it draws with it mutual Support and 
Assistance and Communion of Interest too, as necessary not only to unite their 
Care, and Affection, but also necessary to their common Off-spring, who have a 
Right to be nourished and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for 
themselves."  Marriage has no necessary form or function beyond this "Chief End" of 
procreation, Locke argued against traditional understandings.  Couples were free to 
contract about the rest of the relationship as they deemed fit. "Conjugal society 
might be varied and regulated by that Contract, which unites Man and Wife in that 
Society, as far as may consist with Procreation and the bringing up of Children till 
they could shift for themselves; nothing being necessary to any Society, that is not 
necessary to the ends for which it is made." 
Locke thus combined a contractual and naturalist perspective on marriage.  It 
was a natural right for a man and woman to enter into a marital contract.  It was a 
natural duty for them to render procreation an essential condition of their marital 
contract.  It was the natural right to survival of their child that imposed on parents a 
further natural duty to remain in their marriage once contracted till their children were 
self-sufficient.  "For the end of conjunction between Male and Female, being not 
barely Procreation, but the continuation of the Species, this conjunction betwixt Male 
and Female ought to last, even after Procreation, so long as is necessary to the 
nourishment and support of the young Ones, who are to be sustained by those that 
got them, till they are able to shift and provide for themselves.... whereby the Father, 
who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is under an Obligation to continue 
in Conjugal Society with the same Woman longer than other Creatures, whose 
young being able to subsist of themselves, before the time of procreation returns 
again, the Conjugal Bond dissolves of it self, and they are at liberty....” 
The logical end of Locke's argument was that the childless couple, or the 
couple whose children were of age, should be free to divorce, unless they had found 
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some other "Communion of Interest" to sustain their contract.  Locke dithered on the 
question of divorce.  It was not essential to his political argument to speak 
definitively on the subject, and he knew the dangers of loose literary speculation on 
it in England in his day.  In his private diary, he wrote quite brashly: "He that already 
is married may marry another woman with his left hand. . . . The ties, duration, and 
conditions of the left hand marriage shall be no other than what is expressed in the 
contract of marriage between the parties."8  In his Two Treatises and other 
publications, he only flirted with the doctrine of divorce and remarriage, suggesting 
delicately that the matter be left to private contractual calculation: "[T]he husband 
and wife, though they have but one common Concern, yet having different 
understandings will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore being 
necessary, that the last Determination, i.e., the Rule, should be placed somewhere, 
it naturally falls to the Man's share, as the abler and the stronger.  But the reaching 
but to the things of their Common Interest and Property, leave the Wife in the full 
and free possession of what by Contract is hers by peculiar Right, and gives the 
Husband no more power over her Life, than she has over his.  The Power of the 
Husband being so far from that of an absolute Monarch, that the Wife has, in many 
cases, a Liberty to separate from him; where natural Right, or their Contract allows 
it, whether that Contract be made by themselves in the state of Nature, or by the 
Customs or Laws of the Countrey they live in; and the Children upon such 
Separation fall to the Father's or the Mother's Lot, as such Contract does determine."  
The other logical end of this argument was that the state had little role to play 
within marriage and the family.  For the state likewise was a voluntary assembly, 
formed by a governmental contract among like-minded parties.  The state was 
formed after marriage and the family, and was ultimately subordinate to it in priority 
and right.  The marriage contract sets the terms of the agreement between husband 
and wife, parent and child.  The state could intervene only to enforce these 
contractual rights and duties, and only to vindicate the natural rights and duties of 
each party within the household.   "For all the ends of Marriage being to be obtained 
under Politick Government, as well as in the state of Nature, the Civil Magistrate 
doth not abridge this Right, or Power of either naturally necessary to those ends, 
viz., Procreation and mutual Support and Assistance whilst they are together; but 
only decides any Controversie that may arise between Man and Wife about them." 
Locke did not press this contractarian reconstruction of the commonwealth 
model to the revolutionary ends that some Enlightenment writers would reach in the 
following centuries.  Locke was a man of pious Anglo-Puritan stock who remained 
firmly devoted to biblical teachings throughout his life.  What he gave with his 
political hand, he took back with his theological hand.  His famous Letters on 
Toleration and The Reasonableness of Christianity were tracts of deep Christian 
conviction.  In each of them, Locke called church and state to end their unhealthy 
alliance, to soften their belligerent dogmatism, to return to the simple moral truths of 
the New Testament.  In each of these tracts, he also insisted on coating his doctrine 
 
8 Diary Entry, 1678, 1679, quoted in editor's note to ibid., II, 81, in Laslett, ed., Two Treatises 
(paperback ed.), 364 
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of natural rights and duties with a number of classic Christian conceptions about the 
natural propriety of heterosexuality, monogamy, procreation, nurture and education 
of children, and the like.  "[H]e that shall collect all the moral rules of the 
philosophers and compare them with those contained in the New Testament," he 
wrote, "will find them to come short of the morality delivered by our Saviour, and 
taught by his apostles.... Such a law of morality Jesus Christ hath given us in the 
New Testament [is] a full and sufficient rule for our direction, and conformable to that 
of reason."9  
On the strength of these convictions, Locke endorsed a whole series of 
biblical teachings on marriage and sex that stood in considerable tension with his 
more radical statements on marriage in the Two Treatises.  For example, Locke 
endorsed Christ's reading of the Commandment against adultery as an injunction not 
only against "actual uncleanness, but all irregular desires [and] causeless divorces."  
He endorsed St. Paul's injunctions against fornication, saying that such conduct 
"might be so unsuitable to the state of a christian man, that a christian society might 
have reason to animaadvert upon a fornicator ... as not comporting with the dignity 
and principles of that religion, which was the foundation of their society."  He glossed 
St. Paul's teachings in I Corinthians 7 on the relative merits of marriage and celibacy 
with a matter-of-fact tone that reflects comfortable acceptance of traditional Christian 
doctrine.  Glossing St. Paul's statements on the rights and duties of husbands and 
wives, Locke wrote: "The woman (who in all other rights is inferiour) has here the 
same power given her over the man's body, that the man has over her's.  The 
reason whereof is plain; because if she had not her man, when she had need of him, 
as well as the man his woman, when he had need of her, marriage would be no 
remedy against fornication."  He paraphrased, without comment, Paul's requirement 
that husband and wife remain together till parted by death.  He glossed Paul's later 
requirements that wives must submit to their husbands, and husbands to love their 
wives thus: "It is from the head that the body receives its vigorous constitution of 
health and life; this St. Paul pronounces here of Christ, as head of the church, that 
by that parallel which he makes use of, to represent the relation of husband and 
wife, he may both show the wife the reasonableness of her subjection to her 
husband, and the duty incumbent on the husband to cherish and preserve his 
wife....”10   
Locke stretched the commonwealth model of marriage -- and indeed all prior 
Christian models of marriage -- to the breaking point.  On the one hand, he was a 
devout Christian, fully conversant with biblical teachings on marriage and sexuality, 
but not fully comfortable with their theological exposition or legal implementation in 
his day.  On the other hand, he was a devoted libertarian, fully supportive of the 
 
9 John Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, in The Works of John Locke, 12th ed. (London: C. 
& J. Rivington et al., 1824), 6:140-143.  See also ibid., 11-15, and the fuller account in his Essay on 
the Law of Nature, W. von Leyden, trans. and ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954). 
10 See, Locke, Reasonableness of Christianity, 115; id., A Paraphrase and Notes on St. Paul's First 
Epistle to the Corinthians, in Locke, Works, 7:118-23 (notes on I Cor. 6:12, 7:1-4); id., A Paraphrase 
and Notes on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians, in Locke, Works, 7:488 (notes on Eph. 5:23). 
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revolutionary reconstruction of the English commonwealth, but not fully satisfied with 
its philosophical foundation or its legal reification during the Glorious Revolution.  
From both perspectives, he pressed for a variety of reforms of marriage, family, and 
sexuality – even while retaining much of the traditional understanding of marriage as 
heterosexual monogamous union presumptively for life designed for the mutual 
protection, pleasure, and procreation of husband and wife.  
Locke the theologian and Locke the political philosopher agreed on many 
points of marital reform -- greater freedom of marital contract, greater equality of 
husband and wife, greater emphasis on the procreation and education of children, 
greater restraint on the separation of couples with children, greater protection of 
wives, children, and servants from abuse.  On this twin theological and philosophical 
foundation, Locke helped to prepare the way for many of the legal reforms in the 
common law of England and the broader English Commonwealth over the next three 
centuries.  His views on marriage had no immediate legal impact, but they proved 
remarkably prescient and prophetic. 
Locke the theologian and Locke the political philosopher, however, parted 
ways on many points as well.  Locke the theologian emphasized the biblical norm of 
marriage as a hierarchical order headed by the husband with subjection by the wife.  
Locke the philosopher emphasized the voluntary organization of marriage as a 
negotiated contract between two equal parties.  Locke the theologian vested both 
church and state with a prominent role in the policing of marital and sexual conduct.  
Locke the philosopher countenanced no role for the church, and a minimalist role for 
the state in policing the conduct of the household.  Locke the theologian emphasized 
the duties of marital love, spiritual companionship, and sexual fidelity for life.  Locke 
the philosopher emphasized the rights of marital equality, procreative capacity, and 
parental fidelity until children came of age.   
Many skeptical readers of his day dismissed Locke as an intellectual 
schizophrenic, a man incapable of harmonizing his theological convictions and 
political speculations on marriage, and thus prone to intemperate remarks and 
indecisive principles on both scores.  More sympathetic readers hailed Locke as a 
methodological genius, a man who liberated the theology and politics of marriage 
from each other.  By distinguishing a natural versus biblical, and a political versus 
theological discourse on marriage, Locke broke the presumed organic connections 
between the domestic commonwealth and the political commonwealth, household 
and state, father and king, child and subject.  The household could have its own 
order and organization based on the marital contract; the state could have its own 
offices and functions based on the social contract.  The church could have its norms 
for marriage based on biblical revelation; the state could have its norms for marriage 
based on natural rights.  The church could ground its norms of authority and 
obedience in the Fifth Commandment (“Honor your father and mother”); the state 
could ground its norms for authority and obedience in the social contract.  A pious 
Christian could accept the literal truths of the Bible for his private life, yet advocate 
the liberal reforms of the social contract for public law. 
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To accept Locke's method was to accept the proposition that it was no longer 
necessary to integrate the spiritual, natural, social, and contractual perspectives on 
marriage in an organic model -- whether the Anglican commonwealth model or any 
of the other sacramental, social, or covenantal models of the tradition.  With Locke's 
method, natural and contractual perspectives on marriage could be fully expounded 
without reference to their religious and social implications.  Religious and social 
perspectives on marriage could be fully defended without reference to their natural 
or contractual dimensions.  Moreover, it was no longer necessary for state, church, 
or civil society to play an integrated role in the governance of marriage.  Marriage 
was the first society a person entered from the state of nature, and the terms of the 
marital contract together with the person's natural rights and duties were superior to 
all other governing norms.  If the married person chose to enter into a political, or an 
ecclesiastical, or a civic society, he or she could subscribe to the marital norms of 
that particular society.  But these sets of norms were independent of each other, and 
subordinate to the natural and contractual norms of the marital contract.   
Hugo Grotius, the seventeenth-century Dutch political philosopher on whom 
Locke partly relied for his philosophical constructions, once ventured the impious 
hypothesis that the law of nature could be valid even if "we should concede that 
which cannot be conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God, or 
that the affairs of men are of no concern to him."11  This idea was hardly original with 
Grotius, and hardly acceptable to the establishment of his day.  But Grotius's 
articulation of it in the midst of the bitter religious warfare and persecution of early 
seventeenth-century Europe proved propitious.  It helped to set afoot the 
development of a law of nations and a law of the sea that did not depend upon a 
common theological foundation or necessary role for the Christian church.  
A similar claim might be made about Locke's "impious hypothesis" that a law 
of marriage could be valid even if God were not acknowledged as the founder of the 
marriage contract, or the church not accepted as an agent in the governance of 
marriage.  This idea, too, was hardly original with Locke, and hardly acceptable to 
the establishment of his day.  But Locke's articulation of an independent naturalist 
and contractarian theory of marriage in the midst of the revolutionary upheaval of 
English society also proved propitious.  It helped to set afoot the development of an 
Anglo-American theory and law of marriage and the family that eventually no longer 
depended upon established theological doctrines or upon a necessary legal role for 
the church – though it left open voluntary religious and ecclesiastical forms and 
forums of marriage.   
Locke’s early insights live on in the common law traditions of separating 
church and state in the governance of sex, marriage, and family life.  In most 
common law lands today, it is the state that defines the norms of marriage, family, 
and sexuality that are permissible in the community, even though these state’s 
norms often depart radically from prevailing religious teachings.  Also in most 
common law nations today, religious officials still may officiate at weddings and 
 
11 Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), Prolegomena, 11. 
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declare a couple married “by the power of the state vested” in them.  These religious 
officials also still have freedom to add steps to the state’s marital formation 
requirements (such as premarital counseling) and to refuse to marry same-sex or 
interreligious couples, or those whose moral lives are not consonant with the 
religious community’s teaching.   
 
Common law lands, however, now face growing pressure for a stronger 
separation of religion and state in the formation and governance of marriage.  One 
manifestation of this separationist pressure is the agitation to end the traditional 
practice of giving religious officials the power to declare a marriage on behalf of the 
state.  That reform, which has support among selected clergy and political officials, 
would entirely separate the religious consecration of marriage from its legal 
formation, giving the state a monopoly over marriage law.  It would also relieve the 
growing pressure on religious communities to consecrate every form of marriage 
recognized by the state, even those forms directly contrary to the religious 
communities’ teaching.  
 
A second, opposite manifestation of this separationist pressure is the 
agitation for religious communities to have their own religious laws governing 
marriage which their voluntary faithful have freedom to adopt in lieu of state law.  
That reform, which has its strongest support among some minority religions in the 
West, especially Jews and Muslims, would leave the choice of what marriage law 
governs entirely in the hands of the married couple.12  The argument to provide 
citizens with a straight choice between state and religious marriage laws is now 
pressed in part on the Lockean terms which we discussed above.  One of Locke’s 
most basic teachings is that marriage is a pre-political and pre-legal institution.  It 
comes before the state and its positive laws, both in historical development and in 
ontological priority.  As we saw, Locke regarded the marital contract as “the first 
contract” and “the first society” to be formed as men and women came forth from the 
state of nature. The broader social contract came later, presupposing stable marital 
contracts.  And contracts to form state governments, churches, and other voluntary 
associations within this broader society came later still.  Why, on this simple 
contractarian logic, modern reformers now argue, should the state get exclusive 
jurisdiction over marriage?  After all, it was sixteenth-century Protestants, not 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment philosophers who first vested the state with 
marital jurisdiction.  But why is state jurisdiction over marriage mandatory, or even 
necessary?  Before the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation -- and in many 
Catholic lands well after the Reformation, too -- the Catholic canon law and Catholic 
church courts governed marriage.  Moreover, even in Protestant England until the 
nineteenth century, the state delegated to ecclesiastical courts the power to treat 
many marriage and family questions.  There is evidently nothing inherent in the 
structure of Western marriage and family law that requires that it be administered by 
the state.  And there is nothing ineluctable in liberalism’s contractarian logic that 
 
12 See the range of perspectives in Joel A. Nichols, ed., Marriage and Divorce in a Multicultural 
Context: Multitiered Marriage and the Boundaries of Civil Law and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011).  
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requires marital couples to choose the state rather than their own families or their 
own religious communities to govern their domestic lives -- particularly when the 
state’s liberal rules diverge so widely from their own beliefs and practices.  On this 
latter argument, conservative Muslims sometimes join hands with selected 
conservative Christians and critical liberals who call for exemption from, or the 
abolition of, state marriage law – conservative Christians because the state has 
betrayed traditional Christian teachings on marriage, critical liberals because the 
state is encroaching on individual privacy and sexual autonomy.13 
 
It is hard to predict where these reformist movements might lead.  But it is 
quite clear that Western democracies today are facing as radical a transformation of 
sex, marriage, and family law as anything that obtained in the Protestant 
Reformation.  In the midst of such tumult, it is wise to revisit these great battles of 
the sixteenth century to see what was at stake, to see why they constructed what 
they did, and to see whether those earlier reformers still have something valuable to 




13 See sources and discussion in John Witte, Jr., “The Future of Muslim Family Laws in Western 
Democracies,” Sharia in the West, ed. Rex Ahdar and Nicholas Aroney (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 279-292. 
